I. Introduction
By now it has become olee~ to most linsuists that surface structures of utterances in natural laD6uage are not a sufficient basis for the semantic interpretation, an~ that an abstTact ~eep structure representation has to be assumed in a lin6uistlc desc~Iption, whlch la supposed to correlate the surface strua~xre hierarchical representation of each utter- The questions which arise in postulating deep structure representations are often due to the lack of a possible guide llne ¢oncernin6 the division between the knowledge of l~a~e and knowled6e of the world, and thus between the information which should be included in a full description of a lan6ua~e a~ that which shoul~ or need not. The classical distinction between syntax, which concerns relations between lan~ua6e some further, alternative sign, especially a si@u "in mhich it is more fully developed" as Peirce, the deepest inquirer into the essence of signs, insistently stated "3. The general idea is certainly right, but such an approach leaves much freedom with respect to various possible ways of presentin~ "the alternative signs". Ne will not discuss here the different proposals connected with such an approach to semantics, their assets and drawbacks, but -accepting in principle the thesis that a semantic model for natural language can only be established by means of "alternative signs" -we will suggest one of the possible ways of describi~ the semantic interpretation of utterances.
Following a concept which has already a certain tradition in philosophy, semantics an~ logic ~, but has never been taken seriously by linguists, I will accept the view that the semantic interpretation c~ an utterance is the set of consequences which can be derived from that utterance (or more strictly, from its deep structure description) on the basis of certain implicatienal rules that can be established for the given language. Accordingly, I attempt to search for such a description of deep structures for which it ,/ill be possible to formulate the rules ~hich i call quasi implications 5. In order to avoid confusion in using the term "deep structures" (which by now is employed in different senses, but should be reserved for transformational deep structures, for which it has been clearly defined), I will refer to the logico-semantic structure (LS structure) of utterances 6.
The identification of the semantic interpretation of an utterance with the set of consequences or conclusions which can be drawn on the grounds of that utterance is very close to our intuitive understanding of how we interpret utterances.
To say that the addressee understands an utterancep only if he is able to draw all the conclusions implied by the given utterancep seems to be compatible with the ordinary thinki~ and the estimation of a fully adequate understanding of an utterance. The fact that certain conclusions are based on premisses corresponding to the addressee's beliefs which belong to his knowledge of the world precisely reflects what has been mentioned earlier about the lack of a clearcut division between the knowledge of language and knowledge of the world.
In fact such a division can only be arbitrarily established for a given description of language. For instance, in describing a lexicon (or the rules of the lexicon in a theory of language), we have to make a decision as to Whether certain information concerning a lexical item should be included in the lexicon~ or treated as encyclopaedic information, which pertains to such or other domain of science, speciali- To give an example, we may say that a speaker or author uses appropriately 7 the utterance :
(1) ~ixon has left the United States 8 only if his purported belief is that :
(la) there is one and only "object" which is bein~ referred to bj him as "Nixon"
(Ib) there is one and only "object" which is being referred to by him as "the United States" (1¢) Nixon was in the United States before and if his purported claim is that :
(1~) Nixon is not in the United States at that time.
The propositions (la, lb, lc and ld) can be derived formally from (I) on the basis of certain linguistic quasi i~pli-cations 9, and they below, among ethers, to the set of consequences which constitutes the interpretation of (I). On the other hand, the proposition (le) The President of the United States has left the United State s is a conclusion based on the premiss :"Nixon is the President
Of the United States"~ which may belong to the speaker's and heater's knowledge of the wOrld, but if not included in the description of the lexicon, it will not be derived formally as a consequence.
It is worth noting that the propositions (la, Ib, ic) concern the speaker's purported beliefs, whereas the pro- then the consequences pertaini~6 to the speaker's beliefs will remain the same, and it is only the consequence (Id) pertalnin6 to the speaker's assertion that will become oorrespomdln61y d/fferent. In general all the consequences derived from an utterance can be accepted only as a set of propositions which correspond to the purported attitude of the speaker, n.~ as a set of propositions which hold true. The question of w~ether such propositions are true or not is not a linguistic question, similarly as the problem of whether the "object" being referred to exists in reality or is to be assumed in the context of a novel 10
In terms of the approach suggested here~ontological conslderations have no beariD6 on the LS structure description of utterances, from which ~he same consequences can be d~awn~independently of whether the speaker is sayIn6 the l truth or lyin6, whether he is relati~ his dream, tellln6 a story or repcrtiDg facts.
In this paper we will discuss only those aspects of the LS structure representation which concern certain liz~ist--?-ic quantifyiD~ operator2. As in general we assume that the LS s~ructure could be represented in a language somehow analogous to that of a modified predicate calculus, our aim in the present discussion is to suggest a certain w~y of defining the use of linguistic quantifyi~, operators which would be in agreement with the interpretation of utterances in natural language ~ the present paper is concerned with 11 English utterances only.
The problem of defining the use of linguistic quantifying operators in the LS structure description seems to be one of great significance for the semantic interpretation of the surface syntactic relations, for it appears that it is hardly possible to assign an adequate semantic interpretation 12 to an utterance, if its LS structure is not conceived of in terms of at least one predlcate and its ars~ment (or arguments) prefixed by some linguistic quantlfyi~ operator.
AD~thing we talk about~ that is~ any subject (or sub~ects) of predication, is either a particular "object", a particular relation between "objects" of some sort, a particular situatlon, event, stc~ or else it m~y be a certain number 13 of ~'objects"p situations, etc which are such and such, or finally the subject of predication may be each "obJect"~ situation, ere, which is such and such. Generally speaki~, en utterance is analogous to a logical sentence or proposltion~ rather than to a propositional function with free variables~ and ~hus the LS structure of an utterance may be best conceive~ as a fo~nula in which ~e make use of some sort of lin@~ulst~ Io quantlfyin~ operators.
-8-
The analogy with the language of predicate calculus is not very precise though, and -as we shall try to show -the linguistic quantifying operators must be defined differently than these defined in logic. In the first place, there is a greater number of linguistic devices which function as quantifiers of some sort, and in the second place, even those devices which show an analogy with the operators used in logic have a slightly different semantic function and cannot be defined for our use in the same way as those defined in logic. In the present paper we shall discuss only two linguistic quantifying operators I@, one being analogous to the iota operator defined for the predicate calculus, the other one being analogous to the general quantifier.
2-The linguistic iota operator
The iota operator, as defined in logic 15 can he used in the expression ( ~evertheless, it is an empirical fact quite evlden~ ~hat whenever an addresser uses an utterance containiDg an in-
is always in accordance with his purported belief that there is one and only "object" which is being referred to
In contradistinction to a formal system for which we have ~e define the rules and conditions of correct use, the linguist works in the opposite direction. For we alrea~7 have a given system which we all use successfully for the purpose of intercommunAcation, and the linguist's or the semanticist's job is to detect the rules that make possible the achievement of mutual understandln 6 among ~he competent users of the given language system• Thus in the first place we can analyse utterances only with the assumption that they are used appropriately -otherwise no consistent analysis would have been possible.
The appropriate use of language, as defined for our purpOSeSD is nothing mere than a use which is consistent with ~he rules of language and with the speaker's purported propositional attitudes. It would be thus unreasonable ~o reject such an obvious assumption.
-lO-
We may trytthen)to establish quasi implications ~lich will held truelTand thus yield the correspondi~ consequences for all eases of lin6uistic use in the process of communication.
Accordin61y, we will show that what is defined as a condition of correct use in a formal system, will be derivable in our oase as a consequence of a given utterance.
In the second place, we take into account the fact that utterances of natural lan6uage are never, so to speak, hun6 We thus preserve the uniqueness of the purported "object"
by means of inserting into the common (and thus intersubJeetire) semantic interpretation of indices a parameter which isrttoken-reflexiverPand which serves its purpose(a~ time an utterance is actually used~ in relating signs to extralin~stic "objects" or relations,throug~h the identification of the speaker, the time, place and situation in which ~he given utterance is used. Accordingly;the value of the argument -which in the case under discussion is a linguistic index~ is understood in any particular case, without being possibly indicated in a general linguistic description. In refers other words~ the fact that the speaker ~ to one am~ only "object"! each time he is using an imde~ belongs to the semantic Interpretatlonpan~ is reflected in the propose~ LS structure representation and the corresponding consequences "which ere derivable from It, but the question of what "object" me~ actually be identified by means of such an expression does not belong to the domain of lingaistics° -12 -A~ such "object" m~y only be described in terms of linguistic expressions -it may either be pointed to by means of a name used as an index, or described in terms of the lexical items contained in the definite description used as an 21 index.
A linguist solves thus the problem of how an "object" is described or pointed to in order to be identified, and he ~ not be concerned with Iha___~t it is.
It thus appears that the lin6uistic iota operator is a close analog to the iota operator as defined in logic, the dif~erences lying in our treating the conditions of correct use defined in logic as the consequences of the ever-assumed appropriate use of utterances, and in our introducing the propositional attitudes into the LS structure description.
As it will be argued below, the next linguistic quantifyin~ operator to be discussed in this paper, namely, the all-operator, will also be defined partly by analogy to the iota operator, for the reasons based on linguistic evidence.
The all-operator
In the preceding section we have discussed a certain type of ars~Ament prefixed by the iota operator. Such an argument will be referred to as an argument of type I. Its explicit exponent on the surface can only be a linguistic index, and its role is to indicate one and only "object"
to which a given predicate applies. At present we will discuss another type of argument -which will be referred to as an argument of type 2 -whose role is to indicate all the "objects" to which a given predicate applies. The explicit exponents on the surface of English utterances are usually nominal phrases preceded by "all", "every", "each".
However, it is not always the case that such nominal phrases are to be interpreted as arguments of type 2 (consider phrases such as, for instance, "all the country", every second French man", "each time", etc). Let us now discuss the followln6 examples by means of which we will show the analogy between arguments of type 1 and those of type 2.
(2) John has awaken 
(i0) If anythlng is a boy standing in the doorway it is tall
If anybody is a boy stsnding in the doorway he is tall Anybody who is a boy standin6 in the doorway is tall Even if we ignore ~he awkwardness of utterances such as (i0), we cannot accept such utterances as paraphrases of (9) for reasons. First, (i0) could, then, equally well be taken as a paraphrase of (9) as that of (87, as there is no uention with respect to the plurality of the individuals being referred to.
Thus (i0) could be accepted as one of the consequences from (9), (and this will be shown below to be the case), but not as an equivalent proposition.
Second,, the speaker implies by (9) his purportecl belief that there are individuals who are boys standing in the doorw~7, whereas no such izplication bholds for (10). To give a clearer example, if someone says We assume here that the all-operator belongs to a speclfic class of modifiers which we call ~ linguistic quantllying operators. Such operators will occur in the LS structure representation;always being prefixed to a variable x.
A logical statement which is prefixed by a general quantifier with limited range • is an abbreviation for the i~lieational statement
We will, however, use a different expression, provisionally denoted by (All x) ~ (x), which will not be interpreted as a statement equivalent to an impli'cati@nal statement, but -by analogy to the expression bound by the iota operatorit will be interpreted as an expression of the argument type : all the "objects" which are ~ . According to our interpretation, the corresponding implicational statementwill be accepted as one of the consequences which follow from all-statements.
By analogy to the case of the iota operator, we can here also establish a quasi implication concerning the use of the all-operatorpon the basis of ~he empirically given conditions of appropriate use of all-statements Consider the following propositional schemes:
(a) There is more than one "object" which is ,or any "objeot-. if it i, . it is
The two propositional schemes correspond to propositions which may be considered only in terms of certain proposi~ionsu% attitu£es of the speaker who is ut-beriag an allstatement. We ma~ define a general quasi implicationsul scaeme whiCh, roughly, will be as follows:
A speaker uses appropriately an al ! statementponly if his purpoz~ed belief is that there is more than one "object" w~ich is ~ , and his pu~orted claim is that any "ob- For instance, for the utterance which is a ~uestion :
(17) ~e all the inhabitants of this house sick. ~
we have a set of consequences to which belong, among other propositions, the following two :
(18) The speaker believes that there is more than one "object"
whlch is an inhabitant of this house (19) The speaker wants to know if eu~ "object" which is an inllabitant of this house is sick.
These aonsequsnces are obtained on the basis of a very ~ener-al quasi impllcational scheme conoerniD~ all-stateRents converted into this type of questions.
In conclusion it may be ~rth emphasizin~ that by intro- 10. The term "object" is used here also in the sense of "purported object", that is, for anything namable.
Evidently the knowledge of the type of discourse (everyday, scientific~ literary, etc) may tell us whether the speaker or author believes that a given "object" exists in reality, or it is to be assumed as in a hypothetieal theory, or imagined as in a novel. But such n considerations have no bearing on our present discussion.
11.
In general, it seems that the concepts we are discussing concern other languages as well. If in a given language there are no explicit exponents on the surface which would correspond to the interpretation we are assuming, for instance, for linguistic in- 19.
20.
-25 -is intende& by the addresser, and interpreted by the addressee, as a command. Thus, as it appears from the evidence of fan.age use, it is only the addresser's purported belief :"The door is not open" which may be safely assumed with respect to the given utterance.
The term "propositional attitude" is adopted from Bertrand Russell, Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (Penguin Books, Baltimore-Maryland, 1962).
The term "modal frame" has been coined by A. Wierzbicka (0 sp6jno~ci semantycznej..., op. cir, and her o~her papers). I use the term "propositional attitud~'when referring to the content oi" an utterance, and the term "modal frame", when referring to its explicit representation (which in the present paper is only rendered in words ).
This thesis is based on empirical evidence. If we seem to find apparent counterexamples, it always appears that they are cases of linguistic misuse, and thus they do not falsify lu~ the quasi implication, in such oases the antecedent is false. We are concerned, of course, only with the normal use of utteranoes in the process of communication, not with cases in which utterances are used as examples, when indices are not supposed to identify anything.
There remains one more remark to be made in connection ~ith our quasi implicational scheme. The copula "is" ~aich is used in the consequent should be interpreted as, so to speak, tenseless, for its tense is dependent by means of which we identify one and only neglect"
(a couple of individuals as a ~hole ) to which the ~iven predicate applies. The predicate is not used here distributively as in the case of (~), inhere it applies to each individual referred to by the description "my parents".
23.
The expression (~ x)~(X) is interprete~ as "that one and only object which is ~ ", add not as "there is one and only object which is V ". 1 24. Finally, I wish to excuse myse f for a ratheE loose way I am using certain terms which are well defined in lo~ic (for instance, arE~,ment, value). I hope , \ however, ~at the reader will get from my rough presentation the underlying linguistic concepts which I a~temp~ed to submit for discussion.
